[squid-dev] Allowing the admin to decide if a specific DNS+ip is ok for caching.
squid3 at treenet.co.nz
Thu Jul 19 07:46:09 UTC 2018
On 19/07/18 04:56, Eliezer Croitoru wrote:
> Hey Squid-Dev’s,
> Currently Squid-Cache forces Host Header Forgery on http and https requests.
> - https://wiki.squid-cache.org/KnowledgeBase/HostHeaderForgery
Forces? no. Prevents.
> Squid is working properly or “the best” when the client and the proxy
> use the same DNS service.
> In the past I have asked about defining a bumped connection as secured
> and to disable host header forgery checks on some of these.
Having a connection be bumped does not mean the requests decrypted from
that connection are meant for that server. DONT_VERIFY_PEER and such
false "workaround" are still very common things for admin to do.
A client or intermediary can as easily forge the SNI value on TLS setup
as a Host header in plain-text HTTP. The resulting problems in both
cases are the same.
> The conditions are:
> - Squid validates that the server certificate is valid against
> the local CA bundles (an admin can add or remove a certificate manually
> or automatically)
> - The admin defines an external tool that verifies and/or
> allows host header forgery to be disabled per request.
> I am in the middle of testing 4.1 and wondering what is expected from
> 4.1 regarding host header forgery.
> Was there any change of policy?
No changes from Squid-3 are expected in terms of these checks. There may
be changes in TLS handling which decrypt more (or less) requests.
Any requests which *are* decrypted, the initial CONNECT (from SNI) are
expected to be verified.
TPROXY / NAT intercepted traffic is verified against the against the
dst-IP of the intercepted client TCP connection.
Bumped and non-intercepted traffic (in strict verify mode) against the
server-IP from initial client CONNECT tunnel.
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