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We haven't filtering non_HTTP over port-443. Just recognize and
pass.<br>
<br>
05.01.2015 21:15, Marcus Kool пишет:<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;">><br>
><br>
> On 01/05/2015 12:38 PM, Douglas Davenport wrote:<br>
>> Marcus, not to distract from the very important main
points being discussed here but I have to question your last line:<br>
>> "i.e. there is not yet an interface for this type of
traffic inspection."<br>
>><br>
>> Is that not the whole point of Squid's ICAP interface and
HTTPS bumping? Or do you just mean that ufdbguard doesn't utilize
that yet. If so you might want to consider adding that
functionality...<br>
><br>
> ICAP does<br>
> HTTP filtering based on URL and HTTP content<br>
> port-443 filtering based on FQDN (ICAP server only
receives "CONNECT <FQDN>:443")<br>
> port-443 filtering based on HTTP content _if_ Squid uses
sslbump<br>
><br>
> ICAP does _not_<br>
> port-443 filtering for non-HTTP protocols<br>
><br>
> ICAP was designed for HTTP-based content modification.<br>
> There is no industry standard for filtering non-HTTP data.<br>
> I have discussed this subject twice with the Squid
development team<br>
> but there is currently no sponsor to implement a new protocol
to filter<br>
> non-HTTP data in Squid.<br>
><br>
> Marcus<br>
><br>
><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 9:10 AM, Marcus Kool
<<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:marcus.kool@urlfilterdb.com">marcus.kool@urlfilterdb.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:marcus.kool@urlfilterdb.com"><mailto:marcus.kool@urlfilterdb.com></a>> wrote:<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On 01/05/2015 11:11 AM, Yuri Voinov wrote:<br>
>><br>
>><br>
> And also:<br>
><br>
> don't forget about bogus homebrew internet-bankings. Which is
uses bogus SSL-certs with bogus GOST realisations. And bogus
Java-based clients. All of them also uses 443 port. And often
HTTPS with<br>
> homebrew bogus features.<br>
><br>
> We don't know, how to bump it.<br>
><br>
> What about it? Pass-through? Pass-through.<br>
><br>
> This is clean exclusion.<br>
><br>
> So don't worry about SSH/Tor. To block them we will be use
another solutions. DPI. And not always technical. Revoke
administrative rights from clients is basics of security, like
physical<br>
> access to<br>
> infrastructure. If they can't install Tor/SSH - why we can
worry about this traffic?<br>
><br>
> We have (and can solve) two simple problems. HTTP over 443
port. And SSL Pinning. That's all, folks.<br>
><br>
><br>
> >> It is clear what *you* want.<br>
> >> You prefer Squid + HTTP filter + Cisco/DPI +
tcputils + sniffer + manual maintenance of ACLs/exclude list<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> 05.01.2015 17:51, Marcus Kool пишет:<br>
><br>
> Much of the discussion so far has been about bumping
traffic on port 443,<br>
><br>
> > bumping SSL-encapsulated HTTP traffic and not bumping
(allowing)<br>
> > other traffic. Since port 443 is used for many
protocols, it is in many<br>
> > cases dangerous to allow non-bumpable traffic: SSH
tunnels using port 443<br>
> > are common, so are VPNs. Do you know a security
officer who does not want<br>
> > to block an SSH tunnel, or an app that can share
corporate documents<br>
> > on public websites? If there is not more attention to
these kinds of<br>
> > applications that use port 443 to circumvent corporate
firewalls,<br>
> > Squid will be doomed to be used only in environments
where the priority<br>
> > for security is low to non-existent. Just type
"punching holes in corporate<br>
> > firewalls" or "ssh tunnel proxy" in Google to see how
easy it is to use an<br>
> > SSH tunnel.<br>
><br>
> > I am the author of ufdbGuard, a filter for Squid and
besides filtering<br>
> > based on URLs, ufdbGuard also probes port 443 to see
what kind of traffic<br>
> > the server is expecting. By using probes, ufdbGuard
can detect SSH tunnels,<br>
> > popular chat protocols, etc. but it is not a 100%
guaranteed solution<br>
> > because ufdbGuard cannot not see the traffic that
flows through the proxy,<br>
> > i.e. there is not yet an interface for this type of
traffic inspection.<br>
><br>
> > Marcus<br>
><br>
><br>
> > On 01/05/2015 07:59 AM, Eliezer Croitoru wrote:<br>
> > Hey Yuri,<br>
><br>
> > Indeed there are other *NIX systems and for each and
every one of them<br>
> > there is a solution in need.<br>
><br>
> > SSL Pinned destinations cannot be identified
automatically since the<br>
> > are pinned inside a software and the certificate will
not show<br>
> > anything about that.<br>
> > The basic tests we can do are:<br>
> > - The host is using ssl or tls or not at all(based on
the selective<br>
> > answer of the service)<br>
> > -<br>
> > - If the connection is using tls\ssl then inspect the
components of<br>
> > the certificate(such as rootCA validation against the
local machine<br>
> > certificates DB)<br>
><br>
> > Depend on the goal of the certificate validation the
decision will be<br>
> > made to either allow the connection "uninspected" or
to "bump" it as<br>
> > is without any smart identification.<br>
><br>
> > If indeed there is a database<br>
> > sqlite3\mysql\postgres\redis\__memcached\others it can
be used in the<br>
> > iptables level.<br>
> > Also a point in this DB and this cache is that it will
be persistent<br>
> > so what so ever the *NIX system is there is an option
once the IP +<br>
> > port was tagged as non-bump-able it is better be in
the FIREWALL level<br>
> > override better then squid external_acl.<br>
> > Reason: If the kernel does what it needs to do then
squid should not<br>
> > touch the packets.<br>
> > It's not always right but it's a point in the issue.<br>
> > I still do not know how to work with NFQUEUE and I am
sure that there<br>
> > is an option to make a fast decision and if not then
let the<br>
> > connection be BUMPED.<br>
><br>
> > I have written a small golang script that can check
couple things<br>
> > about the ssl session at:<br>
> >
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www1.ngtech.co.il/__squid/ssl_helpers/ssl___validator.go">http://www1.ngtech.co.il/__squid/ssl_helpers/ssl___validator.go</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www1.ngtech.co.il/squid/ssl_helpers/ssl_validator.go"><http://www1.ngtech.co.il/squid/ssl_helpers/ssl_validator.go></a><br>
><br>
> > Besides this helper there is another script which do
couple things in<br>
> > another level.<br>
><br>
> > ##########<br>
> > If any thing will be decided for squid internals it
will be after a<br>
> > proof of concept that we can implement together.<br>
> > Can we take this thread to storm and put on the table
a proof of<br>
> > concept logic for ssl inspection\bumping and
bypassing?<br>
><br>
> > Eliezer<br>
><br>
> > On 01/05/2015 10:40 AM, Yuri Voinov wrote:<br>
> > >>> Sounds good,<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> but server world is not end on Linux. ;)<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> Now exists another *NIX systems. And will
exists further.<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> Also. I have an idea, gents.<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> Do we can easy and quickly detect SSL
Pinned destinations? And<br>
> > >>> remember it, for example, in database?<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> In another words - both problems is
similar. Either non-HTTPS<br>
> > >>> traffic over 443 port, or pinned certs.<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> Can we detect both of them automatically
and add to exclude list?<br>
> > >>><br>
> > >>> WBR, Yuri<br>
><br>
> >> _________________________________________________<br>
> >> squid-users mailing list<br>
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> >>
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> >><br>
> > _________________________________________________<br>
> > squid-users mailing list<br>
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><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> _________________________________________________<br>
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>><br>
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>><br>
>></span><br>
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