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And also:<br>
<br>
don't forget about bogus homebrew internet-bankings. Which is uses
bogus SSL-certs with bogus GOST realisations. And bogus Java-based
clients. All of them also uses 443 port. And often HTTPS with
homebrew bogus features.<br>
<br>
We don't know, how to bump it.<br>
<br>
What about it? Pass-through? Pass-through.<br>
<br>
This is clean exclusion.<br>
<br>
So don't worry about SSH/Tor. To block them we will be use another
solutions. DPI. And not always technical. Revoke administrative
rights from clients is basics of security, like physical access to
infrastructure. If they can't install Tor/SSH - why we can worry
about this traffic?<br>
<br>
We have (and can solve) two simple problems. HTTP over 443 port. And
SSL Pinning. That's all, folks.<br>
<br>
05.01.2015 17:51, Marcus Kool пишет:<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;">> Much of the discussion so far
has been about bumping traffic on port 443,<br>
> bumping SSL-encapsulated HTTP traffic and not bumping
(allowing)<br>
> other traffic. Since port 443 is used for many protocols, it
is in many<br>
> cases dangerous to allow non-bumpable traffic: SSH tunnels
using port 443<br>
> are common, so are VPNs. Do you know a security officer who
does not want<br>
> to block an SSH tunnel, or an app that can share corporate
documents<br>
> on public websites? If there is not more attention to these
kinds of<br>
> applications that use port 443 to circumvent corporate
firewalls,<br>
> Squid will be doomed to be used only in environments where
the priority<br>
> for security is low to non-existent. Just type "punching
holes in corporate<br>
> firewalls" or "ssh tunnel proxy" in Google to see how easy it
is to use an<br>
> SSH tunnel.<br>
><br>
> I am the author of ufdbGuard, a filter for Squid and besides
filtering<br>
> based on URLs, ufdbGuard also probes port 443 to see what
kind of traffic<br>
> the server is expecting. By using probes, ufdbGuard can
detect SSH tunnels,<br>
> popular chat protocols, etc. but it is not a 100% guaranteed
solution<br>
> because ufdbGuard cannot not see the traffic that flows
through the proxy,<br>
> i.e. there is not yet an interface for this type of traffic
inspection.<br>
><br>
> Marcus<br>
><br>
><br>
> On 01/05/2015 07:59 AM, Eliezer Croitoru wrote:<br>
> Hey Yuri,<br>
><br>
> Indeed there are other *NIX systems and for each and every
one of them<br>
> there is a solution in need.<br>
><br>
> SSL Pinned destinations cannot be identified automatically
since the<br>
> are pinned inside a software and the certificate will not
show<br>
> anything about that.<br>
> The basic tests we can do are:<br>
> - The host is using ssl or tls or not at all(based on the
selective<br>
> answer of the service)<br>
> -<br>
> - If the connection is using tls\ssl then inspect the
components of<br>
> the certificate(such as rootCA validation against the local
machine<br>
> certificates DB)<br>
><br>
> Depend on the goal of the certificate validation the decision
will be<br>
> made to either allow the connection "uninspected" or to
"bump" it as<br>
> is without any smart identification.<br>
><br>
> If indeed there is a database<br>
> sqlite3\mysql\postgres\redis\memcached\others it can be used
in the<br>
> iptables level.<br>
> Also a point in this DB and this cache is that it will be
persistent<br>
> so what so ever the *NIX system is there is an option once
the IP +<br>
> port was tagged as non-bump-able it is better be in the
FIREWALL level<br>
> override better then squid external_acl.<br>
> Reason: If the kernel does what it needs to do then squid
should not<br>
> touch the packets.<br>
> It's not always right but it's a point in the issue.<br>
> I still do not know how to work with NFQUEUE and I am sure
that there<br>
> is an option to make a fast decision and if not then let the<br>
> connection be BUMPED.<br>
><br>
> I have written a small golang script that can check couple
things<br>
> about the ssl session at:<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www1.ngtech.co.il/squid/ssl_helpers/ssl_validator.go">http://www1.ngtech.co.il/squid/ssl_helpers/ssl_validator.go</a><br>
><br>
> Besides this helper there is another script which do couple
things in<br>
> another level.<br>
><br>
> ##########<br>
> If any thing will be decided for squid internals it will be
after a<br>
> proof of concept that we can implement together.<br>
> Can we take this thread to storm and put on the table a proof
of<br>
> concept logic for ssl inspection\bumping and bypassing?<br>
><br>
> Eliezer<br>
><br>
> On 01/05/2015 10:40 AM, Yuri Voinov wrote:<br>
> >>> Sounds good,<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> but server world is not end on Linux. ;)<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> Now exists another *NIX systems. And will exists
further.<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> Also. I have an idea, gents.<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> Do we can easy and quickly detect SSL Pinned
destinations? And<br>
> >>> remember it, for example, in database?<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> In another words - both problems is similar.
Either non-HTTPS<br>
> >>> traffic over 443 port, or pinned certs.<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> Can we detect both of them automatically and add
to exclude list?<br>
> >>><br>
> >>> WBR, Yuri<br>
><br>
>> _______________________________________________<br>
>> squid-users mailing list<br>
>> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:squid-users@lists.squid-cache.org">squid-users@lists.squid-cache.org</a><br>
>> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://lists.squid-cache.org/listinfo/squid-users">http://lists.squid-cache.org/listinfo/squid-users</a><br>
>><br>
> _______________________________________________<br>
> squid-users mailing list<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:squid-users@lists.squid-cache.org">squid-users@lists.squid-cache.org</a><br>
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